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HISTORY'S CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM
.Jeanne L. Schroeder*
LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE. By
James A. Brundage. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987.
Pp. xxiv, 674. $45.

In Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, James
Brundage1 has written a book that is important for anyone interested
in developing a feminist jurisprudence. This exhaustive study demonstrates that certain trends in contemporary feminist legal theories that
seek to explain the feminine and masculine nature of and bases for
contemporary law are both ahistorical and fundamentally
conservative. 2
The trends of feminist jurisprudence to which I refer are those
which Robin West has identified as "cultural" and "radical" feminism. 3 As described by West, both these viewpoints accept that the
definition of human nature (which encompasses the contemporary
American masculine stereotype) which underlies the dominant schools
of American jurisprudence is in fact true of men. In other words, men
actually are the autonomous individuals prior to the community iden• Visiting Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
A.B. 1975, Williams College; J.D. 1978, Stanford Law School.-Ed. I am indebted to David
Gray Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, A.W.B. Simpson, and Paul M. Shupak for comments on earlier
drafts of this book review.
1. Hall Professor of History, University of Kansas.
2. I present this analysis more thoroughly in Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval
Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 15 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming).
3. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). Like all models, West's
cultural-radical feminist dichotomy is in some ways simplistic and distorted in that she does not
attempt to identify the divergence of views of feminists within these groups, nor does she discuss
legal scholars who consider themselves feminists yet do not fall within these categories. I believe,
however, that like any good model, this simplification serves a useful analytical function.
Although I do not believe that West's attempt to link both of these schools of thought with her
"connection thesis" is successful, I believe that her dichotomy enables us to examine common
tendencies among different writers, even though no one writer conforms exactly with the theory
supposedly promulgated by a particular school. Feminist jurisprudence is a new field of inquiry
and is in an extremely fluid stage. It is wrong to conclude from the use of West's dichotomy that
feminist legal scholars have solidified into competing schools of thought, or that there are not
feminist legal scholars working outside of the two "schools" identified by West who are challenging the concept of feminine values. See, e.g., Come//, The Doubly Prized World, 15 Cornell L.
Rev. - (forthcoming); Cornell & Thurshwell, Feminism, Negativity, lntersubjectivity, 5 PRAXIS
INTL. 484 (1986); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989). There is even
more variety among feminists in other disciplines. I do believe that West's characterizations, or
perhaps caricaturizations, accurately describe certain tendencies in much feminist legal scholarship which I find disturbing.
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tified in classical liberal political philosophy.4 Furthermore, both
viewpoints accept that the contemporary American feminine sterotype
is "true" of women: it is either natural, or the inevitable psychological
result of the fact that women are the primary caregivers to children
(the cultural feminist view), or it has been imposed upon women by
men (the radical feminist view). Thus women are, or are forced to be,
nurturing, connective, and relational, and have an ethic of care, as
opposed to the masculine ethic of right. 5 Cultural feminist jurisprudence embraces and privileges the feminine stereotype and seeks to
reinterpret legal issues in light of these "feminine" values. 6 Radical
feminist jurisprudence rejects these values, arguing they are imposed
by patriarchy to keep women weak and subordinate. 7 Consequently,
radical feminism, so defined, seems to privilege certain "masculine"
virtues, such as individuation and empowerment. 8
I believe that both views remain conservative even though they
have taken the single gesture of reevaluating, and deciding whether to
accept or reject, the feminine stereotype. They remain conservative
because they have not yet taken the double gesture of reexamining the
stereotype of masculinity and the concepts of gender difference formed
by our patriarchal society. Patriarchy's stereotype of femininity is defined as the mirror image or negative of masculinity - the construct
of "woman" exists purely to define "man." 9 By not concentrating first
on men's definition of themselves, which is the basis of the concept of
femininity, these feminists are left with a choice of embracing or rejecting an externally generated definition of the feminine self. We will
only successfully discover or create a truly feminist definition of the
feminine self on which to base a jurisprudence of gendered justice if we
4. West, supra note 3, at 14.
5. West, supra note 3, at 18, 27-30, 36-38, 49-50. West notes, but ultimately finds inadequate,
the Gilligan-Chodorow explanation of gender difference resulting from the fact that women raise
children. Id. at 17-18, 20-21. MacKinnon's criticism of the "feminine" stereotype seems to be
largely that it is socially imposed and not freely chosen. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989).
6. See, for example, Leslie Bender's analysis of the lack of a duty to save in tort law, in which
she suggests that a jurisprudence based on an "ethic of care" might generate a different result.
Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988).
7. C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 109-10. See also MacKinnon's discussion of the "feminine voice" allegedly identified by Carol Gilligan as the voice of the victim. MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 73-74
(1985). I fear that both Gilligan and MacKinnon accept the masculine characterization of the
moral differences between American girls and boys which Gilligan believes she has identified.
8. West, supra note 3, at 29-30, 42.
9. Joan Williams expresses a criticism similar to mine as to the cultural feminists' (specifically, Carol Gilligan's) unquestioning acceptance of the stereotype of men "as empty vessels of
capitalist virtues - competitive and individualistic and espousing liberal ideology to justify this
approach to life." Williams, supra note 3, at 841. Even though I generally agree with West's
description ofMacKinnon's work, which I believe relies too heavily on accepting the masculine
view of masculinity, MacKinnon at her best is passionately committed to the problem of how
women can define and create themselves rather than accepting the reality imposed upon them.
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simultaneously deconstruct the masculinist definition of the masculine
self.
By saying current feminist legal history is "ahistorical," I mean
two things. First, both cultural and radical feminist theories are based
largely on the personal experiences of professional-class individuals in
the late twentieth century and do not take into account the very different experiences - and I would say selves - of people living in other
cultures and in other historical periods. Consequently, these theories
are blind to the extent to which the self is culturally determined: 10
Second, because they accept modem cultural descriptions of personality as universal, modem "feminist" jurisprudences do not recognize and analyze the historical roots of the prejudices on which they
are based. The distinction between the historical and the universal is
very hard to grasp if all we have to go by is our own experience. Our
experience is historically produced, and to develop a jurisprudence
based upon experience without examining the culture and thought of
our intellectual grandparents is poor methodology.
A study of history indicates that in different cultures and in different times people held stereotypes of masculinity, and therefore of femininity, radically different from the dominant modem American
stereotypes which I fear so many feminists erroneously accept. Medieval society conceived of the masculine self in many of the ways which
feminists now see as uniquely female or as defined by men as feminine.
Brundage's study of medieval sex law enables us to analyze how these
gender stereotypes were played out in the development of legal theory.
Medieval men saw themselves not as autonomous individuals, but as
creatures bound by their very nature to the community. Men felt
bound not only by ties of lineage and feudal obligation, which were
believed to be both natural and divinely ordained, but also by actual
physical dependence to the other men who comprised their
community. 11
In patriarchal societies, men as subjects define women as objects as
a means of self-definition. 12 In order for men in any given society to
10. That is not to say that many other feminists have not been keenly aware of the culturallydetermined nature of their perspective and criticism. One insight shared by most feminists is the
importance of the role of society in forming gender. This idea was expressed first, and still most
succinctly, by Simone de Beauvoir: "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." S. DE
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H. Parshley trans. 1968). Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon
defends her method precisely because it is culturally (and individually) specific. See, e.g., C.
MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 106-25. My criticism is that these feminists have not yet gone far
enough in that certain of their unexamined assumptions serve to reinstate the very gender categories they wish to deconstruct.
11. Schroeder, supra note 2.
12. Feminists of many different theoretical approaches have described this process by which
men use women as mirrors. For example, Luce Iragaray develops this thesis in the context of
psychological theory in Speculum of the Other Woman. L. IRAGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE
OTHER WOMAN (1985). Catharine MacKinnon makes a similar point in a political context. C.
MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 122.
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ascribe the characteristics which their society privileges to masculinity, they must define the negatives of these "virtues" as feminine. Consequently, the medieval male view of the feminine self which underlies
early medieval law had many characteristics of the modem male view
of the masculine self. Medieval women were considered selfish, individualistic, and outside the order of society. This vision coincides, in
the High Middle Ages, with the apogee of economic power and status
for women. 13 Meanwhile, the "feminine" values of autonomy and sexual equality were adopted by canon jurisprudes as the bases for revolutionizing medieval marriage law.14
Brundage's study enables us to follow and analyze how this process influenced the remarkable developments during the High Middle
Ages in the law most obviously related to gender - the law of marriage, rape, and other issues of sexual regulation. This process had
previously been presented in other contexts by historians such as
David Herlihy in economic history 15 and Georges Duby in cultural
history. 16 Very briefly, in the early Middle Ages, sex law was considered largely a secular matter. It reflected the dominant, and I would
argue masculine, value of privileging the community over the individual. Marriage, divorce, and even rape were collective decisions of a
social group, the extended noble family, overlords, and retainers,
which could be imposed upon the individual.17
In the High Middle Ages, the Church sought to impose an alternate theory of the law of sexuality based on concepts of individuality
including the rights of individual women. The canon lawyers studied
by Brundage eventually concluded that marriage was a decision of individual conscience, not of the community. Specifically, a family
could not force a woman into a legally binding marriage. Rape was
13. David Herlihy's economic research indicates that women's economic status was at its
highest in the eleventh century, with some decrease in the twelfth century (and, of course, substantial regional variations). Women's power and status fell as the patrilinear family became the
dominant structure by the thirteenth century. Herlihy identifies the rise of the patrilinear family
as a response to the changes in marriage law imposed by the Church in the late eleventh and
twelfth centuries, which made obsolete the old ways families preserved inheritance. Herlihy,
Land, Family, and Women in Continental Europe: 701-1200. in WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY
10 (S. Stuard ed. 1976) [hereinafter Herlihy, Land, Family, and Women]; Herlihy, The Making
of the Medieval Family: Symmetry, Structure, and Sentiment, J. FAM. HIST., Summer 1983, at
116, 124-26 (1983) [hereinafter Herlihy, The Making of the Medieval Family]. Stuard agrees that
the eleventh and twelfth centuries were the "watershed" of women's economic status. Stuard,
Introduction to WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY 10 (S. Stuard ed. 1976). Georges Duby believes
this process may have started for French women as early as the mid-eleventh century. G. DUBY,
THE KNIGHT, THE PRIEST, AND THE LADY 99-104 (1983); see also infra note 49.
14. Schroeder, supra note 2.
15. See D. HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL HOUSEHOLDS (1985); Herlihy, Land, Family and Women,
supra note 13; Herlihy, The Making of the Medieval Family, supra note 13.
16. G. DUBY, supra note 13.
17. Schroeder, supra note 2. This is not to suggest that in this earlier time the Church was
not concerned with the moral regulation of sexual behavior or that Church courts and theologians never concerned themselves with sex-related legal issues.
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recognized as a crime committed against an individual woman rather
than merely against her family. Woman, although inferior to man in
almost all ways, was created in the image of God and shared a common spiritual destiny with man. Consequently, canon jurisprudential
theory determined that women should have equal rights with men in a
variety of sexual issues. By the end of this period, the Church was
successful in imposing these new theories of sex law upon the laity, at
least in the case of marriage law. 18 Other scholars have argued that as
secular society internalized the new teachings on marriage and sex, the
structure of the family and inheritance rights changed to women's disadvantage, so that by the late Middle Ages, women's economic status
was much lower than it was during the High Middle Ages. 19
Another movement, which I believe was related, happened simultaneously. The twelfth century is frequently identified with the "discovery of the individual." About this time, the concepts of privacy
and individuality began to be seen as attractive values. 20 This trend
continued until the end of the Renaissance where something resembling our modem concept of individuality as a positive (that is, mascu. line) value was recognized. 21 As a consequence, society by that time
divided the world into public and private spheres. Women, now identified with the stereotype of the nurturing mother, were relegated to
the private world. As Joan Kelly-Gadol has noted, the Renaissance,
usually cited as a high point in the history of the concept of freedom,
was for women a low point.22
Thus, a feminist analysis of the gender politics implicit in the development of legal structures presented in Brundage's study suggests
that the errors of the current cultural and radical feminist agendas are
twofold. First, these trends in modem feminist jurisprudences fail to
18. Pp. 194, 278·79; see also G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 282-84. The Church was not as
successful in establishing exclusive jurisdiction over certain areas of sexual Jaw, such as the Jaw of
rape. Pp. 578-79.
19. See supra note 13.
20. Volume II of A History of Private Life traces this development specifically in the area of
household organization. 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: REVELATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL
WORLD (G. Duby ed., A. Goldhammer trans. 1988) [hereinafter A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE].
See also Charles Homer Haskins' cia5sic intellectual history, The Renaissance of the Twelfth
Century. C.H. HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TwELFTH CENTURY (1927).
21. Although his extreme views seem almost a caricature today, the classic study identifying
the birth of the ideal of individuality with the Italian Renaissance is Jacob Burkhardt's The
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. J. BURKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY (1878). As discussed above, modem medieval historians see the development of
this ideal as a process that began around the twelfth century. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Caroline Walker Bynum, however, argues that although the seeds of individuality as a
positive virtue may be identifiable in the twelfth century, twelfth-century society remained fundamentally communitarian. Bynum, Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?, reprinted in C.W. BYNUM, JESUS AS MOTHER 82 (1982). It would take until the Renaissance for society to
emphasize individualism instead of communitarianism.
22. Kelly-Gadol, The Social Relations of the Sexes: Methodological Implications of Women's
History, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 15, 17 (S. Harding ed. 1987).
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recognize fully the cultural basis for their theories of masculinity and
femininity. Second, they implicitly or explicitly assume that adoption
of a feminine jurisprudence which takes into account (either by
unquestioning acceptance or by rejection) certain values because they
have been labeled as "feminine," will lead to a less patriarchal and
more free feminine world. In fact, history has shown that what we
now regard as "feminine" values have been adopted in the past as
"masculine" values and what some feminist legal theorists have seized
upon as the most likely tools of establishing gender justice were at one
time used as tools of patriarchy and oppression. This is the central
insight which may be gained from a feminist analysis of the material
Brundage has gathered in his book.
I am afraid I might be giving my readers the misimpression that
Brundage's book is either a feminist or an anti-feminist tract, or that it
is even primarily a discussion of the sociology of the Middle Ages as
viewed from a twentieth-century perspective. Brundage does not engage in an express analysis of gender politics. On the contrary, Brundage tries to present the theories of medieval jurists, with particular
attention given to the late eleventh through early thirteenth centuries,
as closely as possible in their own terms, with explanation as needed for
the understanding of a modern audience. Although Brundage definitely has a point of view on many of the issues he explores, such as his
belief that the concept of ritual pollution or impurity underlies much
of medieval sex law23 and his virtual silence on economic arguments
favored by certain other medievalists, he generally tries to present the
material as it was written.24
This is significant because, as Brundage points out in his preface,
most of the materials from this central period have not been published
in modern times and are not generally available (p. xx). In addition,
although Brundage feels a need to apologize for his use of secondary
materials in the portions of the book dealing with the earlier and later
Middle Ages (p. xx), he has done an invaluable service to those of us
who are interested in studying this era but whose foreign language
skills are poor. Medieval historiography has been dominated by Euro23. P. 150. Brundage discusses the concept of ritual impurity and pollution throughout the
book. See, e.g., pp. 214-16 (discussing perceived pollution of intercourse as an important rationale for the imposition of mandatory clerical celibacy).
24. For example, the Church reform of marriage and sex law in the High Middle Ages is
related to other church "reforms" often referred to as "Gregorian,'' after the late eleventh-century reformist pope, Pope Gregory VII. These reforms included the struggle for dominance in
many affairs between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. Brundage notes this connection
throughout and occasionally refers to theories which suggest that the change in marriage law was
a cynical attempt of the Church to wrest economic power from the nobility. Brundage concludes, however, that although the changes in marriage law may have had the effect of shifting
wealth from the nobility to the clergy, this was probably not the clergy's conscious intention. Pp.
586-87. This is consistent with the way medieval scholars debated issues concerning marriage
law.
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pean scholars and the amount of material which has been written in,
or translated into, English is frustratingly limited, although in recent
years there seems to be a welcome publishing trend toward translating
the works of many French medievalists such as Georges Duby and
Fernand Braudel. Because Brundage has slogged through materials
that have never been published (at least in modern times), has gathered together a tremendous amount of other material that has not previously been available in one place, and has presented material that
has not generally been available in English, his book is a necessary
addition to English language medieval scholarship, and I expect it will
become required reading for anyone studying this field. 25
Moreover, Brundage's style is admirably clear and readable, characteristics often sadly lacking in legal scholarship, but more common
in historical writing. A historical survey of the development of a particular legal theory runs the risk of being tediously repetitive, a risk for
which Brundage needlessly apologizes (p. xx). Brundage has met this
challenge and has produced a book that is consistently fascinating. He
has also, almost as successfully, met the greater challenge of writing a
book on sexual issues while avoiding prurience or, maybe worse,
coyness or genteelness. 2 6
Nevertheless, certain limitations in the book's approach may be
25. Consequently, the scope of Brundage's book, and thus this review, is limited in several
ways. First, it is limited to Western Europe. By this Brundage seems to mean primarily the area
included in the modem Common Market countries other than Greece and Spain, with special
emphasis on the areas included in modem France, Italy, and Germany. Second, it is limited to
the law applicable to Catholic Europeans and, after the Reformation, a brief discussion of Protestants; it excludes Jews, heretics, and pagans (except to the extent they influenced Catholic
thought), Eastern Orthodox Christians, and Moslems. Finally, it is limited almost entirely to
discussion of the noble and clerical orders of society, with little discussion of the various free and
servile classes of the peasantry or the merchant and skilled trade (guild) classes of the cities.
Although the laws discussed by Brundage were applicable to all classes in society, these laws
were concerned primarily with the concerns of the two ruling orders. Very little remains of the
other classes written in their own words, and the upper orders did not consider them a sufficiently important subject about which to write. Presumably, substantial property, demographical and court records, as well as personal correspondence and diaries, survive from this period
which could serve as sources for a greater understanding of the legal life of the mass of the
population. Several scholars, including Barbara Hanawalt, David Herlihy, and Georges Duby,
have tried to organize some of this material to enable a better understanding of the economic
reality of the medieval ages. But the life of the commoner in this period still remains largely
unknown to us. Consequently, Brunda3e does not discuss in detail certain aspects of medieval
marriage which would have concerned the lower classes more than the upper orders, such as the
permissibility of marriage between the various classes. For example, could a colona (a half-free
woman) marry a servus (an unfree man) or a villein (a free peasant)? What about marriages
between ministeriales (people who were technically of an unfree class but who served as
chamberlains, ministers, castellans, and in other positions of wealth and power) and vavossars
(lower nobility)? Nor does Brundage discuss whether a serf, or indeed any person bound by
feudal obligation, could legally marry without the consent of her feudal lord. Even if a servile
marriage contracted without a lord's consent was legally binding, was the serf still subject to
punishment and taxes for this infraction?
26. I did find some of his efforts to avoid repetition, such as finding a different term to describe what was considered a deviant heterosexual sexual position each time the subject is discussed, rather cloying. But this is a minor cavil.
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initially disturbing to legal scholars. These are Brundage's insufficient
discussion of the nature of his project and his limited definition of
what constitutes "law."
By failure to discuss his project, I mean that Brundage does not
expressly disclose his underlying presumptions and prejudices, does
not define his terms, does not explain his choice of subject matter, and,
as I will discuss more thoroughly below, might be criticized for per·
haps giving a misleading description of the scope of his book. The
reader is forced to try to draw inferences as to what Brundage is doing,
often leading to frustration, if not misunderstanding. Perhaps legal
education gives one a heightened awareness of the importance of pre·
cisely delineating one's terms and communicating one's parameters.
Brundage is not completely successful in this respect.
To me, and I expect to most women, the most glaring example of
Brundage's failure to explain his project is his total silence on the sub·
ject of abortion. 27 Not only are the issues of sex and abortion inextri·
cably linked, 28 but abortion is one of the most hotly contested issues of
sex law today. This omission is so remarkable that it cries out for an
explanation. The decision was not necessarily wrong, but the various
reasons for omitting the discussion have modem political and theoreti·
cal overtones, and are based on assumptions which should have been
explained. I found myself constantly wondering what Brundage's rea·
saning was, and what this implied about his thesis of law, his attitude
toward women, and the reliability of his analysis.
I can imagine at least three possible reasons for Brundage's omis·
sion of any substantive discussion of abortion, one of which I consider
legitimate, one of which I consider illegitimate, and one of which I
consider neutral. First, I am sympathetic with a decision to omit a
discussion of abortion because of its very complexity and the need to
circumscribe the scope of the book. Brundage could not cover all
legal issues relating to the law of sexuality over so broad a historical
period in one book - the book is close to 700 pages as it is. Because a
discussion of abortion involves not merely legislation concerning sexu·
ality, but various moral, philosophical, and theological debates as to
the nature of human life, autonomy, bodily integrity, women's nature,
and sexuality, to name a few, it might best be left for a second book
which can explore these issues more thoroughly. In addition, the de·
bate on abortion has produced much historical research in recent years
and Brundage may have justifiably felt that another book on this sub·
27. Brundage uses the word "abortion" only once in the entire 674-page book, in a footnote
which discusses the reasons behind the Church's condemnation of "deviant" coital positions.
The footnote discusses whether "deviant" positions were condemned because they were too pleasurable, because they were considered bestial, or because they hampered procreation as did contraceptives and abortion. P. 163 n.160. I found this reference only because of the book's
excellent index.
28. This would have been even more of a truism in the Middle Ages than today.
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ject was not as urgently needed, especially when there were other areas
of medieval sex law which had not been adequately explored and
which might be relevant to the current debate. In other words, this
decision may have resulted from a sensitivity to the importance and
complexity of the abortion issue and the practical need to limit the
scope of his work.
A second reason for omitting a discussion of the law of abortion is
one I would reject: that abortion policy is not fundamentally a policy
of sex law. It is not news that attitudes toward abortion, although
often framed in terms of "right to life" are, in fact, reflective of underlying views of sexuality and the role of women. On a more prosaic
level, even today, the leading cause of pregnancy is heterosexual intercourse - indeed, as Brundage presents in exhaustive length throughout the book, most medieval theorists believed procreation to be the
only, or at least the primary, moral justification for sexual activity. 29
To discuss procreation as the justification for the legality of marriage
without discussing one of the primary means of thwarting procreation,
i.e., abortion, is strange. Indeed, in this context Brundage does discuss
the law of contraception, albeit briefly. 30 Thus, Brundage's decision
might have been based on an insensitivity to the nature of the issue, a
decision which would make me question Brundage's judgment and
other decisions throughout the book.
A third possible reason for this omission, which I will develop
presently, may stem from Brundage's decision to allow the canon
scholars he is studying to define the field for themselves. Thus, Brundage's medieval clients, and not Brundage himself, have set the
agenda. If this is the reason for omitting any discussion of abortion,
then the omission itself is part of the text, and, therefore, worth analyzing explicitly.31
29. See, e.g., pp. 197, 279-81.
30. See, e.g., p. 358.
31. Other omissions which could have been explained are the absence of any extended discussion of the property law of marriage (except for passing references to the issue of whether or not
dowries or bride prices were considered necessary components of a binding marriage, see pp. 275,
344-45) and the law of legitimization of children and inheritance. Medieval marriages (at least
marriages of the noble class) were to a very large extent property matters - and property matters of extended families, not individuals. How property was distributed and who was permitted
to inherit were, and would have been considered at the time, fundamental to any marriage law
issue.
This is especially true if one accepts a commonly offered economic theory of the reasons
underlying certain changes in marriage law propounded by canon lawyers in the eleventh
through thirteenth centuries. According to this theory, the Church was intentionally attempting
to diminish the economic power of the great medieval noble families as compared to the Church.
See supra note 24. This goal was served by interfering with the nobility's ability to use marriage
as a way of cementing alliances. This was done by forbidding families from contracting marriages for their members without the individual consent of the married couple, adopting very
broad definitions of incest which prohibited marriages between closely affiliated families, and
prohibiting divorce which enabled political marriages to be dissolved to reflect shifts in dynastic
politics. Once again, even if these subjects were omitted purely out of the practical necessity of
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The canon legal theorists themselves may not have viewed abortion as an important issue of the law of sexuality, in contrast to what
many moderns think. Or, abortion might not have been considered a
burning issue of any branch of law by the decretists. If this were true,
it would be anachronistic to include a discussion of abortion in a book
which tries to present the legal theories of the Middle Ages as they
were understood in their own time.
Georges Duby has suggested that medieval penitentialists writing a
generation before the first decretists did not include a discussion of
contraception in their works involving marriage and other sexual relations. 32 Rather, this subject was included in the same works as those
which covered abortion - that is, in discussions of murder and violence. 33 If Duby is correct, then is Brundage being internally inconsistent by discussing, albeit briefly, the law of contraception in a work
that purports to study medieval sex law on its own terms? The avoidance-of-anachronism argument would seem, then, to support exclusion of any discussion of both abortion and contraception but not one
without the other. More importantly, however, there is some historical justification for including a discussion of abortion even in a study
that seeks to take medieval sex law in its own terms. Gratian, for
example, did include a hypothetical about abortion in his Decretum, in
a section which was occasionally published separately as the Treatise
of Marriage; 34 and Innocent III, one of the popes whom Brundage
believes to have been particularly important in the development of canon sex law, also issued at least one opinion condemning abortion. 35
Were these two the exceptions in the canon sex law literature? In any
event, even if I have guessed correctly as to why Brundage excluded
abortion from his book, a brief discussion of Brundage's methodology
in his foreword, or at least in a footnote would have been useful. 36
If this is Brundage's reason for omitting a discussion of abortion, it
reflects the most serious limitation of the book's scope from a jurisprudential perspective- the author's limited definition as to what is law.
As is fairly typical among nonlawyers (and unfortunately all too common among lawyers), Brundage uses the term "law" to mean legislation and the semi-official pronouncements of legal scholars in the
limiting the scope of the book, rather than out of insensitivity to the interrelationships between
these issues, it would have been helpful for Brundage to have explained this more clearly.
32. G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 62.
33. Id.
34. See Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION 20
(J. Noonan ed. 1970).
35. Id.
36. Brundage does make clear that the issues of marital property rights, legitimacy, and inheritance always remained within the jurisdiction of secular courts throughout the Middle Ages,
even after the Church imposed its jurisdiction over other aspects of family law. Pp. 319, 409,
482-84, 578-79. This was, therefore, not a subject explicated by the canonists Brundage is studying and is logically excluded from the book.
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canons, papal decisions, and other works which Brundage discusses in
loving, and fascinating, detail. He does not include in his concept of
law the actual legal structure of society - that is, law as it is actually
lived, perceived, and enforced in the community through litigation
and custom. 37 This decision not to examine anything but "black-letter
law" is particularly true for the period Brundage covers in greatest
detail - the late eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the period
about which Brundage makes his greatest contribution.
This period, often referred to by various flattering titles such as the
"High Middle Ages" or the "twelfth-century renaissance," 38 was aperiod of great intellectual activity and changes in social structure, the
status of women, and the jurisdiction and power of the Catholic
Church. As discussed above, during this period, the Church, in large
part through the efforts of the canon lawyers studied by Brundage,
reexamined its position of the early Middle Ages that sex and marriage
were primarily secular and private, to be governed by families and the
secular government, with the Church's religious pronouncements on
sexual behavior being moral, but not legal, exhortations relevant to the
state of man's soul. By the end of this period, medieval society had
adopted the Church's new view under which the Church achieved excfosive legal jurisdiction (both as to what we would call forum and
subject matter jurisdiction) over certain fundamental issues of marriage and sex law (pp. 223-25). During this transition period, both the
secular and ecclesiastical courts competed for jurisdiction, enforcing
radically different concepts of marriage law. 39
Brundage's entire analysis of this period, however, is limited to the
consideration of the doctrines of the canon lawyers, i.e., the law
professors he refers to as the "decretists" or "decretalists" (because
they edited and analyzed collections of papal decisions known as decretals), and of the reformist popes, whose textbooks, treatises, and
legal opinions developed the theories which, by the beginning of the
37. A rejection of a definition of "law" as limited to statutes, cases, and so on, is implicit in
the feminist critique of the public-private right distinction in American law and the suspicion of
the use of a "right to privacy" as the basis for a right to abortion. For example, I interpret one of
Catharine MacK.innon's central theses in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State as the identification of a "private" realm (family, home, sex, and so on) which is separate and distinguishable
from the "public" or "political" realm, and the recognition that the relegation of women to this
private realm is itself a fundamentally political act. Consequently, that which is deemed most
private is, in fact, that which is most political. C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 34-36.
Similarly, I suggest that the identification of a realm of the "private" which is beyond legal
regulation is itself fundamentally a legal regulation. If the ideal of the classical liberal state is
that the public realm with which men are identified should be the government oflaws, and not of
men, then the creation of a private realm with which women are identified means that the "traditional" ideal for women is, literally, that we live under a government of men, and not of laws.
38. See, e.g., c. HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY vii-ix (1927).
39. This process is the subject of the central portion of Brundage's book, in particular his
discussions at pp. 223-28 and 319-24. By the late fourteenth century, after the Church's marriage theories had been accepted by secular society, the secular government was successful in
reasserting jurisdiction over some sexual issues. Pp. 578-79.
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thirteenth century, became the definitive canon and secular law of
marriage, law which held sway until the Council of Trent in 1563. He
does not describe in any detail either the process by which this jurisdictional change came about, or what law was enforced and how, during this transitional period. It is probably true that the secular arm
did not produce jurists who codified or systematized the old law or
who wrote legal treatises describing secular law (lawyers, like virtually
all highly educated men, being almost exclusively clerics). Nevertheless, Brundage could have examined other sources.40
A variety of contemporary sources could have contributed to a
fuller definition of medieval law. The secular arm operated courts and
produced court records; court historians wrote chronicles which included descriptions of major marital litigation between great families;
and individuals wrote personal correspondence describing the important events in their lives, including marriages and divorces. Brundage's extensive footnotes supporting his conclusions indicate that he
was, in fact, aware of these materials. His failure to discuss these
other sources, particularly case law, in the analysis which forms the
heart of his book (instead of stating his conclusions partially drawn
from this material) may seem even more surprising in light of the fact
that he does discuss these sources to some extent in the portions of the
book dealing with the early and late Middle Ages. Moreover, in his
other writings, Brundage has both examined a wide variety of sources
and adopted a case-based approach in analyzing the practice of reproductive law in the Middle Ages. 41
The period Brundage examines was also one of increased literary
activity, and a wealth of the then-new genre of romances and other
works are available. Although fictional, these works tend to concern
sexual and marital matters and could serve as a mirror of the actual
workings of medieval society. Once again, although it is apparent
from references in the book that Brundage is familiar with these
works, he makes only conclusory statements regarding the changing
legal theories of marriage and how they reflect, and were influenced
by, the changing secular perceptions of marriage and sexuality implicit
in chivalrous romances and the ideal of courtly love. 42 These comments only make the reader want to know more and to question
whether Brundage's conclusions are correct.
40. Michael Sheehan, for example, has examined parochial (i.e., local ecclesiastic) court
records as well as sermon books and other handbooks for parish priests to study how these new
theories were taught to, and when they were adopted by, local clergy. Sheehan, Choice of Marriage Partner in the Middle Ages: Development and Mode of a Theory ofMarriage, in 1 STUDIES
IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE HISTORY 9-15 (J. Evans ed. 1979).
41. See, for example, Brundage's contributions to SEXUAL PRACTICES & THE MEDIEVAL
CHURCH (V. Bullough & J. Brundage eds. 1982).
42. The longest passage in the book concerning this interrelationship is one paragraph in a
conclusion at the end of a chapter. Pp. 227-28.
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Brundage discusses neither the operation of secular law in the secular courts during this transition period nor the actual application of
canon law in the ecclesiastical courts. Although he discusses the decretals of the various reformist popes,43 who were consciously active in
the development of canon marriage law and the expansion of Church
jurisdiction, Brundage's discussion is limited to giving the final rule of
law which he believes was developed in each case. His omission of a
description of the facts of the individual cases presents the "law" as
only that which is written in the statutes, judicial dicta, treatises of
learned professors, and so on, and ignores its actual application in individual cases.
Thus, Brundage uses what is probably a more restricted definition
of law than most contemporary American legal scholars would adopt.
Only in the application of stated rules of law to individual cases are we
able to see the development of the law. 44 Brundage "reconciles the
43. These decretals were papal decisions in specific disputes, which were gathered together in
case books used by the law faculties in the medieval universities. They would be roughly analogous to Supreme Court decisions today. Brundage indicates that during the twelfth century, a
significant percentage of these decretals involved marital issues. Pp. 325-37.
44. Indeed, other writers have analyzed the facts of the cases underlying certain decretals
and the hypotheticals used to illustrate different rules in the case books in order to explain the
societal assumptions and the changes (or lack of changes) that the case represents. In The
Knight, the Lady and the Priest, Georges Duby used a variety of sources to examine the facts
underlying several notorious divorce cases (including the sensational divorce of Eleanor of Aquitaine from King Louis VI of France) which resulted in important decretals on marriage and
divorce, and further used this examination to explore society and the status of women in the
twelfth century. G. DUBY, supra note 13. The works of John Noonan, Jr., and Michael Sheehan
are enriched by their examination of the specific hypotheticals and supporting cases used by
Gratian, one of the earliest and most influential medieval law professors, to develop his version of
the canon law of marital consent. Noonan, Power to Choose, 4 VIATOR 419 (1973); Sheehan,
supra note 40, at 8-13.
For example, Sheehan shows the originality of Gratian's theories by presenting in detail the
facts and holdings of the precedents on which Gratian relied in his interpretation of a certain
causa or hypothetical relating to the minimum elements constituting a legally enforceable marriage - often considered the basis oflater canon law. Sheehan demonstrates that Gratian could
have read the available precedents as only requiring true familial, as opposed to paternal, consent
to a marriage or as requiring that paternal consent be free and uncoerced. In one case, the
findings of fact indicated that the mother and certain other relatives had declared their opposition to the marriage and that the father may have agreed to the marriage out of fear of a superior
lord. Sheehan, supra note 40, at 10. Similarly, the case could have been interpreted only as
prohibiting child marriages, because the daughter, who did not give consent, was described as an
infantula, a little girl. Instead, Gratian adopted the revolutionary theory that a marriage is not
legally binding unless the bride consents. Id. at 8-13.
On the other hand, Sheehan's analysis of Gratian's hypotheticals indicates that Gratian may
not have held, as is frequently claimed, that only individual consent was required for marriage,
because the hypotheticals and language of the holding are consistent with the rule that both
individual and familial consent are required for marriage. This analysis helps one understand the
development of the legal theory by showing in what ways Gratian's theories were similar to and
different from secular marriage as actually practiced and from Church doctrine as actually
preached. Finally, the specific factual analysis shows that Gratian in each case was concerned
with the woman's rights in marriage; he mentioned only in passing that the rule would probably
also apply to men. Id. at 11-12. Brundage, in contrast, comes to the same conclusions, but does
not give the background so that the reader can follow his analysis and decide whether she agrees
with Brundage's characterization of the legal rule. See pp. 235-42.
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cases" for us and presents his own conclusions as to their proper interpretation, but does not present the information necessary for us to
make our own analysis. Some lawyers may be dissatisfied with this
aspect of the book, and underestimate the contribution which Brundage has, nonetheless, made.
A greater discussion in the book of the decisions of the lower
courts, both secular and ecclesiastic, during this period would also be
appropriate. Despite official pronouncements as to the indissolubility
of marriage, how many divorces were, in fact, granted? Despite ecclesiastical prohibition of marriages within seven degrees of relationship
without dispensations, how many "incestuous" marriages were actually permitted? Despite the fact that the canon law of adultery was
theoretically the same for husbands and wives, how was it actually
applied in the case law?45 Were these cases rare exceptions to the
rules? Or were the "exceptions" in fact the norm, and the stated rule
the exception? As I stated, Brundage does engage in this analysis in
his discussion of the earlier and later Middle Ages, but not of the period which is the focus of his book.
Disappointingly, because ofBrundage's restricted definition of law,
he does not discuss in any detail the other revolutionary societal
change in attitudes toward sexuality and marriage which occurred
contemporaneously with the development of canon law - the development of courtly love and the romantic ideal.46 Brundage does mention in passing that several aspects of courtly love, particularly the
emphasis on individual choice of sexual and marital partners, the increased recognition of the individual worth of women, and the concept
that sexuality might not be all that bad after all, were consistent with
the new canon law and probably influenced its development. He does
not, however, attempt to reconcile those equally important aspects of
courtly love which seem to oppose some of the most basic concepts of
canon law: for example, the idealization of physical, adulterous love
between young knights and the wives of their liege lords. 47 If this was
an ideal propounded by the noble laity, an ideal diametrically opposed
to the chastity and marital fidelity demanded by canon law, then what
was the "law" of adultery which affected these people's lives on a dayto-day basis?
45. Brundage notes that despite the theory that the same sexual standards were supposed to
apply to both sexes, many canon legal theorists were inconsistent in this regard, especially in
their discussions of the law of adultery. See, e.g., pp. 284, 306·07. He discusses some disparities
in the late Middle Ages in the frequency with which men and women were prosecuted for adultery (surprisingly, men were prosecuted more than women, but that may be because society
tacitly permitted men to use "self-help" against their adulterous wives, while women were required to bring their claims in court), and the relative harshness with which male and female
adulterers were punished. P. 519.
46. See, e.g., G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 216-26.
47. See G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 216-26; A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, supra note 20, at
76, 82, 145; see also pp. 184-85, 204-05, 227-28, 300-01.
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Brundage also does not discuss the effect of changes in marital law
on marriage and se:icual customs and the peculiar social institutions
governing feudal marriage. In particular, he fails to discuss the practice of preserving a family's wealth by forbidding younger sons, who
did not share in the eldest brother's inheritance, to marry unless they
were independently able to provide for a household (for example, by
marrying a rich wife). 48 Since not all of these sons were destined for
the clergy, those "youths" (as they were called regardless of their
age)49 were not always willing or able to abide by the canonists' exhortation to chastity and were not satisfied with the pleasures afforded by
prostitution (an institution which, Brundage points out, was frequently tolerated by the medieval Church both in theory and practice
as a necessary evil, less damaging to the fabric of society than adultery) (pp. 310, 342, 389-96, 445, 463, 521-30). These youths sought an
outlet for their sexual energies, youthful enthusiasm, and yearnings for
the security and companionship of a permanent household. If the
literature and chronicles of the time are to be believed, they turned to
48. David Herlihy, by contrast, suggests that the Gregorian Reform of marriage led directly
(although probably unintentionally) to this custom of agnatic inheritance and lineage, conjugal
marriage, and the impoverishment of women. D. HERLIHY, supra note 15, at 86. Herlihy argues
that prior to the Gregorian Reform, inheritance was "cognatic" (le., reckoned through the
mother as well as the father), rather than "agnatic" (le., reckoned through the father), precisely
because marriages were negotiated by families and were easily terminable. Family alliances frequently shifted so the same individual might "belong" to different families at different times in
his or her life. One's distaff (or maternal, the distaff being the symbol of femininity) bloodline
could therefore be as important as one's spear (or paternal) bloodline. Mothers had an
independent social importance and families more freely gave inheritances to daughters and
younger sons as part of marriage strategies. Families maintained their wealth not through primogeniture or other limitations on inheritance rights, but by controlling monasteries and other
church properties. Id. at 22.
The Gregorian Reformists wrested control of Church property from the nobility who then
had to find a way of maintaining their wealth - they did this by limiting the number of heirs
through primogeniture (or, sometimes ultimogeniture) whereby younger (or older) sons did not
share in an inheritance and daughters' rights were limited to dowries. Id. at 87. The Church's
insistence on the indissolubility of marriage, coupled with primogeniture, permitted the tracing
offamily roots to one male heir. Thus, families became agnatic (or, as Duby would characterize
it, agnatic lineage was superimposed upon cognatic lineage, which survived to some extent). As a
result, women's importance in the family line diminished. The number of marriageable noblemen declined, as fewer men were wealthy enough to marry, and as the marriage market for
women tightened, dowries became larger. At the same time, women lost control of their dowries
in marriage. See id. at 82-103. Dante gives a similar account of the development of his own
family from a cognatic structure (using a matronymic) to an agnatic structure (using a patronymic) and the simultaneous loss of economic power of Florentine daughters. DANTE, THE
DIVINE COMEDY: PARADISO, Canto xv, lines 103-05 (G. Bickersteth trans. 1932).
49. Duby gives several examples of men described as "youths" (juvenes) in contemporary
chronicles and literature who were actually in their mid-forties, a fairly advanced age in medieval
times. Those unfortunate younger sons who were neither attractive, skillful, nor lucky enough to
woo an heiress or otherwise acquire sufficient wealth to maintain a household lived out their days
in perpetual adolescence traveling from castle to castle (they were generally not welcome at their
parents' and siblings' homes) to enter tournaments and, at best, play the traditional role of
avunculus (maternal uncle), educating their more fortunate nephews in "youth" culture. One of
the reasons for the crusades propounded at the time (not a modem interpretation) is that they
got rid of the excess "youths." G. DUBY, THE CHIVALROUS SOCIETY 112-22 (C. Postan trans.
1977).
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means absolutely unacceptable to canon lawyers: adultery, abduction,
and concubinage. 50 Was canon law, which protected a woman's right
to choose her own husband and which made it easier for younger sons
to seduce and marry heiresses, partially a response to this social problem? Or, as David Herlihy suggests, were the impoverishment of women and other social problems of the later Middle Ages the result of
the change in marriage law?51 Or did the strict rules of canon law lead
to the gradual abandonment of these restrictions on younger sons in
the later Middle Age?
Brundage's decision not to discuss in detail these societal influences in the High Middle Ages should not undermine the importance
of his original contribution to the study of this period by reliance entirely on original legal texts. Indeed, there are many intriguing studies
of the social influences of the High Middle Ages and Brundage may
have intentionally decided to supplement this work by concentrating
his efforts on making available materials which were inaccessible for
centuries. Brundage's use of original documents for this core part of
the book is one of his most valuable contributions. Indeed, I cannot
overemphasize the Herculean labor Brundage has accomplished, poring over innumerable ancient - in most cases handwritten - Latin
manuscripts containing probably some of the most turgid material
ever written, in order to give as complete as possible a presentation of
the legal scholarship of the time. I fear, however, that Brundage's insistence on using only original materials for this section may have actually weakened it through his failure to put the materials in the
context of the time.
A final caution about the book is that a casual reader might be
initially discouraged by what seems at first blush to be a lack of consistency in approach throughout. For the earlier and later time periods
covered in the book, Brundage does in fact discuss secular law and
custom and, to a certain extent, discusses individual cases and even
refers occasionally to literary materials. However, for the period of
Brundage's greatest expertise, Brundage limits his discussion to these
original texts. Brundage warns his audience in his foreword that, in a
way, the book is really three separate books: "a monograph (Chapters
6-9) wrapped in a survey (Chapters 1-5, 10-11) with a final segment
(Chapter 12) that summarizes the whole thing and draws conclusions
50. Id. at 119-22; see also G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 216; A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE,
supra note 20, at 76.
51. See D. HERLIHY, supra note 15, at 81. By the thirteenth century, society was perceived
to have an excess of unmarriageable women caused by the changes in family structure, changes
which many historians link to the rise of new religious groupings for women, such as the Beguines. This "problem" was known as the Frauen/rage ("the woman question"). Bolton, Mu/ieres Sanctae, in WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY, supra note 13, at 147-48; Stuard, supra note
13, at 8-11. Caroline Walker Bynum gives a feminist twist to the Frauen/rage: "If daughters
were increasingly a problem for families, it stands to reason that family was increasingly a problem to daughters." c.w. BYNUM, HOLY FEAST AND HOLY FAST 225 (1987).
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from it" (p. xx). · One cannot, therefore, use this book to compare different periods of the Middle Ages to each other.
Brundage may be justified in objecting that my criticism merely
reflects my desire to read a different book than the one he chose to
write, and that I am not analyzing on its own merits the book that he
in fact wrote. This is partially correct, but to a large extent when reading the book I had the impression that Brundage, or at least his editor,
appears not to have understood what the book really was about. The
title of the book, its foreword, and the breadth of its discussion
throughout indicate that the book is a discussion of both the law of
sexuality, in its broader meaning of constituting actual practice in addition to legislation, and the culture of marriage throughout the Middle Ages. However, Brundage's book is really something much
narrower: it is an intellectual history of the ideas of a handful of canon jurists who Brundage believes (correctly, in my view) have profoundly influenced our modem laws and superstitions concerning
marriage, sex, and gender. This perspective explains not only the
structure of the book, but also the choice of subject matter and the
definition of terms used.
In the first section of the book, Brundage discusses in great detail
the antecedents of the decretists of this period. He discusses in great
length not only the secular sex law and customs of the Romans and
the Germanic tribes of Europe, and of the Frankish and other early
medieval kingdoms, but also the writings of the early Church fathers
and the penitentials and other religious writings of earlier periods.
When Brundage reaches the period in which these theorists were
working, he switches to a discussion of their theories as they presented
them in their own writing. How these theories were applied in practice, what other competing secular theories existed at the same time,
and the actual jurisdiction of these theories as laws at this time are not
relevant to this discussion. In other words, for the eleventh through
thirteenth centuries Brundage discusses only one branch of legal theory and makes no attempt to discuss the law of sexuality as a general
matter, let alone sex or Christian society. Brundage then returns to a
broader discussion of the law and society of later periods in order to
explore the influence that these theorists had on later European law now conceived in the broader sense of actual practice - and, most
importantly to Brundage, on modem American law. Thus, Brundage
tries to present the legal theories of a certain group of men, and he
gives the historical, legal, and social antecedents, and the legal and
social consequences.
Brundage's definition of law may also be seen as a result of historical integrity. The High Middle Ages were the dawn of the development of organized legal faculties and the study of law as a separate
branch of inquiry. By restricting himself to that which medieval legal
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scholars perceived as legal discourse, he correctly avoids the error of
"doing history backwards" - that is, imposing modem sensibilities on
an imaginary past and interpreting historical societies not in their own
terms, but only as though they were inevitable evolutionary precursors
of our society. 52 In fact, it is only extremely recently, and thanks in
large, but by no means exclusive, part to the work of feminist legal
scholars, that American legal scholars have begun to take a broad interdisciplinary approach to law, ceasing to study law as consisting entirely of statutes and appellate opinions.
Because of the limitations on the scope of the material covered by
Brundage, readers who are not already ·familiar with the available
literature on medieval scholarship may need to read this book in conjunction with a book that describes the culture of this period in greater
detail in order to place canon law theory in context. For example,
Georges Duby's The Knight, The Lady and The Priest, 53 through its
examination of several notorious divorce cases, discusses the struggle
of the Church to gain jurisdiction over marriage and divorce litigation
and to influence secular attitudes toward marriage in the twelfth century. The second volume of A History of Private Life, entitled Revelations of the Medieval World, 54 once again edited by Duby, examines
the development of marriage and the status of women in the broader
context of what is sometimes referred to as the "discovery of the self,"
the development of the concept of the autonomous individual through
the Middle Ages.
In sum, Brundage's book is vital for those who would develop a
jurisprudence of feminism. I give much credit to the book for inspiring what I call my "historicist" perspective toward a body of recent
feminist work. Although the story of the development of medieval sex
law is extremely complicated, and lends itself to many interpretations,
I believe it leads to an account of gender stereotypes which should give
pause to modem feminist writers. The account suggests that a variation of today's feminine virtues, such as relational thinking, interconnectedness, and, indeed, an ethic of car~ 55 were touted in the Middle
Ages as masculine virtues. Further, patriarchy was capable of expropriating medieval feminine values, such as individualism, and transforming them into legitimatLt1g virtues that served patriarchy. This
accentuates the need to develop a jurisprudence that is not dependent
52. In her excellent study of medieval English peasant life, Barbara Hanawalt cites anthropologist Jack Goody as the originator of this wonderfully apt description of the "ethnocentrism
of modernism" which can be found in many histories of family life. B. HANAWALT, THE TIES
THAT BOUND 10 (1986).
53. G. DUBY, supra note 13.
54. 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: REVELATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD, supra note
20.
55. See supra note 5; see also c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. NODDINGS,
CARING (1984).
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upon definitions of a female-male dichotomy, which is itself a patriarchal account, but which develops a theory capable of accommodating
difference without defining ourselves and our virtue exclusively
through difference.
Those of us who are dedicated to the feminist critique of contemporary American jurisprudence should not see historicism as a dispiriting attack on the work of feminist legal theoreticians to date.
Rather, it should be seen as a verification of the most important insights of feminism to date: the inadequacy of conventional jurisprudence to understand and explain women, the failure of jurisprudence
to question its own assumptions and its own perspective, and the failure of jurisprudence even to see, let alone explain, the suffering and
oppression of women and their domination by men. Historicism exposes the lie that conventional jurisprudence is sex-neutral, scientific,
and value-free.
Still, more important for the future, historicism should be seen as a
challenge not to fall into the same errors as the jurisprudes whom we
criticize: failure to recognize the cultural perspective from which we
view ourselves, unquestioning acceptance that our unmediated experiences have a universal or essentialist application, and acceptance of a
static and mutually ex<?lusive theory of gender which can only be restrictive on an individual level and lead to continued patterns of dominance and submission on a societal level. Brundage's book is a
valuable advance toward that aim.

